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Indonesia, a Jilbab Democracy?

Henk Schulte Nordholt ends his book (“Indonesia na Suharto, reformasi en restauratie“, 2008;ISBN 978 90 351 31354 ) with a quote by Ben Mboi, ex governor of Nusa Tenggara Timur: “Indonesia is like the Titanic. The only difference is that Indonesia keeps on sinking without perishing“.

I can say it at the outset: this is solid but tasty contemporary history. Preceded by two chapters on the Sukarno era and the Suharto’s New Order, it is mainly about the last ten turbulent years of Indonesia. An easy, informative and pleasant read, despite the thorough and scrupulous scientific approach the author took. It contains a lot of relevant facts ( of course), quite a number of new and refreshing insights ( at least to this reader) and useful matter-of-fact debunking of a number of myths, plus a general conclusion which leaves a lot of doubt about Indonesia’s future as a democracy.

Background

The first observation which attracts attention is that the New Order epoch ( ’65 – ’98), a defining stage in Indonesian history, very much resembled the colonial society in it’s last stage (’25 – ’42):

- opponents of the regime were exiled ( to Boven Digoel and Buru respectively)

- the same laws were used to control and restrict press freedom

- both administrations set strict limitations to control Islam (no political ambitions were tolerated)

- the main priority of the army was not a ( potential) external threat, but control of the civilian population

- a small part of the Chinese minority was granted relatively huge economical privileges at the cost of complete ( political) dependence on the state. And by consequence being at the mercy of the political top brass and gradually developing inbred corruption.

This is just to make clear that Indonesia had to come from far away on it’s way to a modern democracy. The continuation of bad habits over so many years can not be washed away overnight. The sending away of the dictator may well have been a necessary precondition, but was not a sufficient one.

The crisis

Actually the downfall of Suharto-regime in ’98 was not a total surprise. The regime itself had worked on it. That is: the system had grown it’s own endogenous instability. The economic growth had been financed by ever growing debts. In the mid nineties the national debt already amounted to an astonishing $ 100 billion. At the same time the boom had helped to create a self assured middle class of nearly 40 million people that demanded political influence. The same happened among members of the largest Islamic organizations (NU and Muhammadiya). They also got political ambitions. Moreover the opposition had an appealing face for the first time: Megawati.

Another factor was the weakening of the position of the army. Because of loosing influence there was a lot of infighting. And internal fights became the rule. The generals were confronted two kind of competitors who vied for power and money as well: the modern technologists led by Habibie and the economic cronies of the President who he favored with monopolies the army wanted/needed itself ( the army had to take care of 70% of it’s budget).

“Krismon”, the Asian monetary crisis of ’97, was the beginning of the end of the President. It did hit Indonesia hardest. Hyper inflation, investment strike, riots and violence. The measures taken by the government proved to be counter productive and the situation ran out of hand. “Krismon became “Kristal”, total crisis. The students came in and ultimately the communis opinio became: Suharto is the problem, he has to go.

He went, accompanied by disturbances and violence which was specifically directed at the usual scapegoats: the Chinese minority. After the fires had been extinguished and the dead had been buried, the new ambitions were set: changing the centralized and autocratic state into a decentralized “civil state”, changing an economy of conglomerates into one of mainly small and middle sized enterprises and changing constitutional law from a law of the rulers to a law of rule.

From New Order to Confusion, Chaos and Violence.

But unfortunately the ‘revolution’ got stuck after the removal of the president.

Most godfathers of the Suharto era survived the crisis. The distribution of influence may have changed, but generally speaking the old ‘nomenclatura’ stayed in power. Unfortunately for a pretty long time the civilians among them were just busy fighting each other and defending own interests in the developing new power balance. The army had some substitutes but also successfully accommodated to the circumstances. It lost its seats in parliament, lost some of it’s economics entrepreneurial interests, but a large part of the twifungsi (defense against the internal and external foes of the state) was secured and the repressive “regional system” (military outposts in every district, in every village) remained.

Three presidents later, apart from the new and rather appropriate procedures for democratic elections, the only worthwhile result of the 1998 uprising was a blueprint for “devolution” ( the decentralization of tasks annex power to districts): more provinces (+ 7), more districts (+ 140). It was, actually the birth of regional shadow states. It was a blueprint made by a small group of technocrats which created far reaching and important changes notwithstanding. In ’99, when the amendments were passed in parliament, Ryaas Rashid had become the midwife of a number of new power elites away from Jakarta. With the elections of that year it meant chaos to start with.

Busy bickering amongst themselves, the ruling elites had left the country practically to its own fate: in Kalimantan, Ambon and Poso riots broke out and violence reigned. And separatism had surfaced in Aceh and Papua. Not, as often is assumed, by plotting allies of Suharto or by direct Army involvement. Not because of ethnic and religious animosity as such either, but because of the regional and local power vacancies which were the outcome of the changes in Jakarta. Members of the local elite – the governor, the local army commander, the Sultan, the main entrepreneur, etc – saw the challenge and the opportunity and mobilized whatever allies they could find to use whatever means they thought were fit, to come to power. In combination with ambitious would be local/regional politicians, that created an explosive mixture. Especially where ethnic and/or religious differences had always been in a delicate balance, where the economy had depended on the government in Jakarta – the lifeline which suddenly disappeared- and where a host of officials were the main pillar of employment, a lot of violence occurred.

The SBY years (2004 – …)

The 2004 elections were a success. They were a kind of turning point. They gave a real boost to the process of democratization. It also was a decisive proof Indonesia was able to organize free and fair elections. Especially the impressive participation ( 84%) and some remarkable results do make them into a milestone:

- Megawati’s PDI-P lost, because of the president’s incompetence naturally. But first and foremost because of the corruption several prominent members of the party had been involved in;

- Golkar, which had been the political vehicle of Suharto for so many decades, won. But insufficient to compensate for the losses of its cartel partner PDI-P;

- so the new Partai Demokrat of the presidential candidate SBY (8,5% of the votes) could tip the balance and proved to be the platform to launch him to the office in the next presidential elections;

- and in spite of the growing influence of religion in Indonesian society, the Islamic parties gained only 4% and stayed well below 20%.

During the four years of the Presidency of SBY, relative stability has returned to the country. This happened in spite of a series of distasters which struck the country: tsunami’s, earthquakes, a gigantic mud disaster annex political scandal( in which vice president Jalla has been involved). The economy has recovered. Inflation is relatively low and the growth rates are 6 – 7%. Though about 50% of the population is still living in poverty

A special constitutional court has been installed and is operating with success. Some big fishes has been caught. Nevertheless corruption still is widespread and remains the plague of the country. In combination with a weak tax system and low tax morality, it’s a long way to a real civil society and to a country with low white collar crimes and an overwhelming majority of law abiding citizens endowed with strong citizenship.

In Ambon and other remote area’s the violence seems to be under control. And, even more important, the civil war in Aceh has been successfully ended. Yet the trauma’s are still there and till this moment the local societies have not been able to really come to terms with the atrocities which have been committed.

After the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005, the attack on the Marriott Hotel (Jakarta) in 2003 and the Australian Embassy in 2004, violence inspired by political Islam, seems to have petered out. Or at least the groups of extremists have been infiltrated and neutralized by the secret services: recently a number of arrests have been made in a Sumatran “safe house” before any damage could occur. But it remains difficult for the authorities to deal with the likes of Bashir – they are approached with utter cautiousness. A recent example: the handling of the violence used by extremists against a deviant Islam movement, Ahmadiyya. The government choose for compromising with the violators at the cost of the victims.

Though the police has officially been made independent from the army now, it does not mean it lost control all together. The military is still strong and omni present. On the other hand the political parties are weak. In as long as the defense forces are not back in the barracks, out of entrepreneurship and not restricted to one goal ( defense against external threats), the structural framework of society remains weak.

Indonesia is still a secular state. Yet Indonesian society is more and more permeated with religion, with Islam. Public calls for prayer, clothing, TV preachings and, most significant, a “trendy Islam lifestyle” for the new middle classes. That does not mean the fundamentalists – wahabism or salafism- are about to take over. On the contrary – Laskar Jihad or even Abu Bakar Bashir’s Jema’ah Islamiyah apparantly have passed their peak and remain marginal. There is even strong opposition agianst this Arab version of Islam. If, in surveys, over 70% of the Indonesians indicate they advocate the introduction of the “shariah”, it usually is about the strong wish for an alternative, better, legal system. One of the main attractions of the religion is it’s condemnation of corruption.

Let’s choose to be optimistic

The original goals of ’98 have not yet been reached -

- the civil state is, at best, in scaffolding

- the economy is not yet the economy of small and medium sized businesses

-the rule of law has not yet significantly replaced the law of the rulers

So, I guess there are lot of reasons to fear for Indonesia’s future. But there are sufficient clues to be optimistic also. The second quote which is on the last page of the book by Henk Schulte Nordholt is one by Munir: “I have a child of one and a half years old and I hope he will grow up in a better Indonesia. A more democratic country which will be able to feed it’s population and will maintain civilized standards. I think that this can be accomplished in the next twenty years” .

The assassination of Munir was a bad omen. But the convictions and arrests since are signs of hope. And it may help if, what happened in Western Europe (Christian Democratic Parties – conservative on moral issues, but mixed on socio-economic issues) and Turkey (The AK party, conservative on religious and moral issues, but mixed on socio-economic issues and progressive on international ones) would happen in Indonesia also. I mean that it is possible to match an influential moderate political Islam with a secular democracy. To merge the claim to political influence by those who want to shape their lives according to their religion, with a democratic political system which grants the same rights to opposite claims. There is nothing wrong with a Jilbab democracy -in as long as the headscarf is a free and personal choice.

“Indonesia na Soeharto” is a professional and readable book. I think it deserves to be translated in Bahassa Indonesia and English.